Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review
Volume 30
Number 1 Symposium: Making It Available at
Your Own Risk: A Look into Copyright
Infringement by Digital Distribution

Article 2

9-22-2009

Brief of Amici Curiae Computer & Communciations Industry
Association abd U.S. Internet Industry Association - Elektra
Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker
Andrew P. Bridges
Winston & Strawn LLP

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew P. Bridges, Brief of Amici Curiae Computer & Communciations Industry Association abd U.S.
Internet Industry Association - Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker, 30 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 41
(2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol30/iss1/2

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC.,
et al,
Plaintiffs,
05 CV 7340 (KMK)
V.

DENISE BARKER,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION AND US INTERNET INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION IN CONNECTION
WITH DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

Andrew P. Bridges
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
101 California Street, 39th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111
Ph: (415) 591-1482
Fax: (415) 591-1400

42

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB LE OF AU THORITIES ..........................................................
ii-ii
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................
I

IN TERESTS OF TH E AM ICI .........................................................
2

AR G U M EN T .....................................................................
4
I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 106(3) OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT ..............................
4

II.

PLAINTIFFS' BROAD CONCEPTION OF "MAKING AVAILABLE" IS NOT
EMBRACED BY THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT OF SECTION 106(3) AND
CANNOT SUPPLANT OR EXPAND THAT RIGHT ..................................
6
A.

Not All Instances of "Making Available" Constitute "Distributions" Under
Section 106(3), And Allegations Of "Making" Works "Available" Do Not
A llege "D istributions... ....................................................
6

B.

Courts That Have Carefully Examined The Statute Have Limited The
Distribution Right To Conduct Specifically Identified In Section 106(3) .............
9

III. EXPANSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT POSES A THREAT OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES TO COMMERCE .................................
10

IV. THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT NEED NOT BE EXPANDED TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OR REMEDIES FOR COPYRIGHT OWNERS BECAUSE
THEY HAVE ADEQUATE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER OTHER
PROVISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW .............................................
12
V.

THE WIPO DIGITAL TREATIES DO NOT CALL FOR AN EXPANSION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT ...................................................
14

C O N C LU SION ....................................................................
15

.NY:1013415.1

i

20091

MAKE ITAVAILABLE AT YOUR OWN RISK

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................ 9 n.7
Agee v. ParamountCommunications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995) ................ 10, 10 n.8
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) ........................................

12 n.10

Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) ...........................

4

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) .................

8, 9

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ...............................................
3
Gershwin PublishingCorp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159
(2d C ir. 197 1) .........................................................................................................

11 n .9

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ....................................

3

Harper & Row v. The Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985) ............................... 12 n. 10
In re Napster, 377 F.Supp.2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ..................................................

9, 9 n.7

IntellectualReserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 1290
(D . Utah 1999) .......................................................................................................

11 n .9

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ..................... 3
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) .........................................................................

3

STATUTES

17 U .S .C . § 10 1.................................................................
.. 5, 10
17 U .S.C . § 106 ...........................................................................................................
17 U .S .C . § 106(1) .......................................................................................................
17 U .S.C . § 106(2) .......................................................................................................
17 U.S .C . § 106(3) .....................................................................................................

4
12, 13
12
p assim

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) ...............................................................
4, 7 n.4, 8, 9, 12, 14

NY:1013415.1

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

44

[Vol. 30:1

17 U.S.C. § 106(5) ................................................................................

4,7 n.4, 8, 9, 12,14

17 U.S.C. § 106(6) .................................................................................

4, 7 n.4, 8,9, 12, 14

17 U .S .C . § 107-122 .....................................................................................................

4

17 U .S .C . § 20 1(d)(2) ...................................................................................................

12

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) ...................................................................................................

13

17 U .S.C . § 901(a)(4) ......................................................................................................

8

35 U .S.C . § 2719(a) .......................................................................................................

8

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Circular92, Copyriuht Law of the United States of America iii-viii (June 2003),
........................
http://www.copyright.gov/title 17/circ92.pdf .............................

4

M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.11 [A] (1993) ...................... 10
M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.01[A] (2005)........................ 12
The American HeritageDictionaryof the English Language 1025, 1020, 1529,
159 1 (3d ed.1992) ....................................................................................................
U.S. C onst. art. 1,§ 8, cl.8..............................................................................................
Wikipedia, Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle,
http://en.wikipedia.orgiwiki/Fallacyof theundistrubutedmiddle ...................

6 n.3
3
7 n.5

WIPO Copyright Treaty ................................................................................................

14

WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty .............................................................

14

111
NY:1013415.1

2009]

MAKE ITAVAILABLE AT YOUR OWN RISK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------X

)

ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC.,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

)

)
)
)
)

05 CV7340(KMK)

)

DENISE BARKER,

)
Defendant.

)

)

--------------------------------------------------------- X
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION AND US INTERNET INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION IN CONNECTION
WITH DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Computer & Communications Industry Association and US Internet Industry Association
("Amici") file this brief as amici curiae to address an issue of critical importance in copyright
law, the scope of the distribution right in section 106(3) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
106(3), that extends far beyond the particular facts of this case. This brief has been prompted by
Plaintiffs' argument that there is a general "making available" right under U.S. copyright law.
See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 15-22. Plaintiffs offer a misguided analysis of
the section 106(3) distribution right. Plaintiffs' argument seeks to expand the concept of
"distribution" to incorporate an overbroad concept of "making available" in order to challenge
Defendant for having sound recordings on her computer in a "shared file folder" available to
others over the Internet via a peer-to-peer file sharing system. Such an expansion would allow
Plaintiffs to avoid having to allege or prove that Defendant actually distributedany copies or
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phonorecordsof copyrighted works to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending as required by the plain language of section 106(3).
Amici do not take a position on whether Defendant is liable for copyright infringement in
this case. Nor do they take a position on whether Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for
copyright infringement. Amici focus, instead, on the Plaintiffs' effort to expand the section
106(3) "distribution" right of copyright owners under the Copyright Act. Such an expansion of
the section 106(3) distribution right would both ignore the plain language and structure of the
Copyright Act and distort copyright law in a way that would threaten varied interests across the
American economy and society.
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI
Amici are associations of companies that make communications over the Internet
possible.' Their businesses depend on intellectual property rights. Amici believe that their
members are far more often plaintiffs than defendants in intellectual property litigation.

Computer & Communications Industry Association ("CCIA") is a nonprofit membership
organization for a wide range of companies in the computer, Internet, information technology,
and telecommunications industries, represented by their senior executives. For more than 30
years CCIA has promoted open markets, open systems, open networks, and full, fair, and open
competition. Its companies vary widely in size and operate both domestically and globally.
Members, identified on Exhibit A to this memorandum, include computer and communications
companies, equipment manufactures, software developers, service providers, re-sellers,
integrators, and financial service companies. Together they employ almost one million workers
and generate nearly $250 billion in annual revenue.
US Internet Industry Association ("USIIA") is a North American trade association for
Internet commerce, content and connectivity. Founded in 1994, USIIA advocates effective
public policy on Internet issues and provides its members with essential business news,
information, support and services. With members of every size, engaged in virtually every facet
of the Internet, USI1A promotes a business environment in which Internet companies can thrive.
A general description of USIIA's members is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit B.

2
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Amici well understand, however, that intellectual property laws deserve respect not only
for the powers and rights they confer but also for the limits they set. Careful and thoughtful
construction and application of intellectual property laws serve the ultimate goal of those laws,
which is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" as reflected in Art. I., section 8,
clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
While the establishment of intellectual property rights provides important incentives for
creativity and innovation, the undue extension and overenforcement of those rights may have the
opposite effect, of choking creativity and innovation. Efforts by Plaintiffs to rewrite copyright
law should not be countenanced by a court. The result Plaintiffs seek must be sought from
Congress. Congress, not the courts, has the proper role of establishing copyright policy through
the laws it enacts. Congress, not the courts, has the means to hear from, and to evaluate the
interests and views of, a wide spectrum of participants in the American economy and society.
The Supreme Court has consistently articulated the importance of judicial deference to Congress
as the source of copyright law. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984). As the Court recently stated:
it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause's objectives. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S., at 230, 110 S. Ct. 1750 ("Th[e]
evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties
Congress faces .... [IUt is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored
to achieve."); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429, 104 S. Ct. 774 ("[t is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] that should be granted to authors or to
inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product."); Graham,
383 U.S., at 6, 86 S. Ct. 684 ("Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy
which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.")
Eldredv.Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212-13 (2003).

I'Y:IOI415.1
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 106(3) OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
SPECIFICALLY DEFINES THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT.
"The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language." Community

for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (Marshall, J., interpreting the
Copyright Act for a unanimous Court). That is especially important with copyright law, which
Congress comprehensively overhauled in 1976 and has amended over 50 times since then. See
"Circular 92," Copvright Law of the United States of America iii-viii (June 2003) (identifying
amendments from 1976 until June 2003) (available at pages 2-8 of PDF file at
http://www.copyright.gov/titlel7/circ92.pdf); see also http://www.copyright.gov/title17/
(identifying five further amendments since June 2003).
Section 106 of the Copyright Act identifies five exclusive rights of a copyright holder.
By shorthand reference they are typically described as the rights of reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, public performance, and public display. The rights, however, are very specific: in
some cases, for example, rights exist only with respect to certain types of works. See 17 U.S.C.
2
§§ 106(4)-(6) (identifying specific types of works eligible for certain rights).

Clause (3) of section 106, which establishes the distribution right, is itself very specific.
Taken together with the preamble of section 106, that provision states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending ....

2For example, the section 106(4) right applies only to "literary, musical, dramatic, and

choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works"; the
section 106(6) right applies only to "sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3) and (6).
4
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17 U.S.C. § 106(3). The statutory language has three important elements. First, the right under
section 106(3) is to distribute copies orphonorecordsof copyrighted works. Second, the right is
to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public. Third, the right is to distribute copies or
phonorecords to the public by sale or other transferof ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
The "distribution" right under the Act is defined by its elements, and the statutory
protection is neither expansive nor elastic. The right under section 106 is to distribute certain
things, to certain recipients, in a certain way.
The first and third elements are important both to a narrow question in this case, whether
possession of an index of files available for transmission by a peer-to-peer system constitutes a
distribution under section 106(3), and to the broader question implicated by Plaintiffs' argument,
namely whether a variety of activities over the Interet implicate the section 106(3) distribution
right merely because they may constitute a "making available" of copyrighted works. As to the
first element, "copies" and "phonorecords" are defined terms in section 101 of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. §101. That section states, in relevant parts:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.

"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work. are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
The statute defines "copies" and "phonorecords" as material objects. Distribution of "copies" or
"phonorecords," therefore, must mean the distribution of material objects.

5
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The third element of the section 106(3) right is a distribution of copies or phonorecords
"by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." Those terms are not
3
defined in the Copyright Act, but their meanings are plain.

Amici take no position on whether Plaintiff in this case has sufficiently alleged any of
these activities by Defendant. They do urge the Court, however, to determine that any violation
of section 106(3) must flow from the actual conduct of one of those activities.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' BROAD CONCEPTION OF "MAKING AVAILABLE" IS NOT
EMBRACED BY THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT OF SECTION 106(3) AND
CANNOT SUPPLANT OR EXPAND THAT RIGHT.
Plaintiffs' argument, if accepted, would have the effect of substituting a broad and

undefined concept of "making available" in place of the clearly defined "distribution" right in
section 106(3). This Court should not allow Plaintiffs to rewrite the statute in this fashion.
A.

Not All Instances Of "Making Available" Constitute "Distributions" Under
Section 106(3), And Allegations Of "Making" Works "Available" Do Not
Allege "Distributions."

Amici do not dispute that the activities identified in section 106(3) -- namely sale,
transfer of ownership, rental, lease, and lending -- constitute forms of "making available." The

3 "Sale" involves an "exchange of goods or services for an amount of money or its equivalent."

The American HeritageDictionaryof the English Language 1591 (3d ed. 1992). ("For sale" is a
phrase indicating availability for purchase, see id., but the sale itself is not the mere availability
for purchase - or else sales taxes would apply to mere inventories of goods offered for sale
instead of transactions.) A "transfer of ownership" requires a change of ownership from one
person to another, and the substitution of one owner for another (not the multiplication of
ownerships). Rental involves the payment of "rent," which is "[p]ayment, usually of an amount
fixed by contract, made by a tenant at specified intervals in return for the right to occupy or use
the property of another... a similar payment made for the use of a facility, equipment, or service
provided by another." Id. at 1529. "Lease" involves "[a] contract granting use or occupation of
property during a specified period in exchange for a specified rent." Id. at 1025. To "lend" is
"[t]o give or allow the use of temporarily on the condition that the same or its equivalent will be
returned." Id.
at 1030.
6
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converse, however, is not true: not all instances of "making available," however, constitute
distributions under section 106(3).

4

To the extent Plaintiffs are arguing that any activities that may be vaguely described as
"making available" a work to the public -- such as an unconsummated offer to transmit a sound
recording file -- fall within the distribution right of section 106(3), their argument is seriously
misguided and logically flawed. The logical error is the well-known "fallacy of the undistributed
5
middle." As applied to Plaintiffs' distribution arguments in this case, the fallacy is as follows:

A.

All distributions constitute "making available."

B.

An unconsummated offer to share music constitutes a "making available."

C.

Therefore, an unconsummated offer to share music is a distribution.

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the presence of sound recording files in a "shared file" folder of
a person's peer-to-peer network software constitutes a "making available" by that person that is
therefore a "distribution" in violation of section 106(3). See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss at 15, 20. The presence of recordings in the "shared file" folder, however, amounts to
no more than a potential for a transmission or an offer to transmit the files. Leaving aside
whether the person is making materialobjects ("copies" or "phonorecords") available, the mere
availability or offer of files for potential upload to a network (and potential download by another

'For example, as discussed below, public displays and public performances (governed by
sections 106(4)-(6) of the Copyright Act) make works "available" to the public but are not
distributions under section 106(3).
An example of the fallacy is as follows:
A.
All students carry backpacks.
B.
My grandfather carries a backpack.
C.
Therefore, my grandfather is a student.
Wikipedia, Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacyof the
undistributedmiddle.
7
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user of the network) is not a "sale or other transfer of ownership, or... rental, lease, or lending."
It is therefore not a section 106(3) distribution.
Both the language and the structure of the Copyright Act justify this conclusion. First,
Congress well knows how to distinguish acts from offers to act. Indeed, the Copyright Act itself
makes that distinction in another section. In section 901 (a)(4), relating to protection of
semiconductor chip products, the Copyright Act states as follows:
[T]o "distribute" means to sell, lease, bail, or otherwise transfer, or to offer to sell, lease,
bail, or otherwise transfer.. -.

17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4) (emphasis added). The same distinction occurs in the Patent Act. In that
act the core infringement provision states as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, orsells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent.
35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (emphasis added). 6 The omission of "offer to sell" from the definition of the
distribution right in section 106(3) is meaningful.
Second, because other copyright rights involve aspects of "making available," there is no
reason to find all kinds of "making available" activities to be "distributions" under section
106(3). Displaying a work publicly (which implicates section 106(5)) makes that work available
to the public in that the public can enjoy the work. Performing that work publicly (which
implicates sections 106(4) or 106(6)) similarly makes that work available to the public. Even
though "public displays" and "public performances" make works available to the public, they do
6 As noted above, Congress has the ability to amend the Copyright Act, and the Supreme Court

has deferred to Congress' role in enacting and emending the law. The Supreme Court rejected a
previous attempt to create a "mutant copyright," noting that "[w]hen Congress has wished to
create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with much more specificity ......
DastarCorp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23; 34 (2003).
8
NY:1013415.1

MAKE ITA VAILABLE AT YOUR OWN RISK

2009]

not constitute "distributions." Plaintiffs' argument that any "making available" constitutes a
"distribution" under section 106(3) would make the public performance and public display rights
of sections 106(4), (5), and (6) superfluous. "A statutory interpretation that renders another
statute superfluous is of course to be avoided." Dastar,539 U.S. at 35. That the redundancy
would appear within subsections ofthe same section of the same statute only makes evident that
the Plaintiffs' proposed interpretation is untenable.
B.

Courts That Have Carefully Examined The Statute Have Limited The
Distribution Right To Conduct Specifically Identified In Section 106(3).

Defendant's reply brief correctly addresses the relevant case law regarding the Plaintiffs'
effort to expand the distribution right under Section 106(3). Without repeating Defendant's
arguments, Amici point out that the decision in In re Napster, 377 F.Supp.2d 796 (N.D. Cal.
2005), is particularly instructive. The decision focused squarely on whether a list of files
available for download was a "making available" in violation of the distribution right under
section 106(3). The court rebuffed the efforts of record labels, like Plaintiffs here, to expand the
distribution right to cover other forms of "making available." Amici urge this Court to follow
7

the well-reasoned opinion in In re Napster

Amici recognize that some cases, discussed by the parties, have summarily concluded
that a mere availability of an upload may constitute a distribution. Those cases generally have
7 That case was follow-on litigation by record companies against Napster's investors following

earlier rulings in the underlying litigation against Napster itself that was presided over by the
same district judge. Plaintiffs here and in other cases cling to an obiter dictum by the Ninth
Circuit in an appeal of the underlying Napster litigation stating that Napster users who uploaded
file titles to indexes violated the "distribution right." See A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit gave no analysis, no authority, and no
extended discussion relating to that brief dictum. In fact, the district judge in the follow-on case
sidestepped that dictum by saying "Defendants do not ask the court to revisit the legal issues
surrounding plaintiffs' 'uploading' and 'downloading' theories. Rather, they assert that plaintiffs
have failed to submit enough evidence in support of these theories to [avoid summary
judgment]." The court then ruled that there was sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment.
In re Napster,377 F.Supp.2d. at 806.
9
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displayed no extended analysis or reasoning, and they have often occurred in contexts where the
courts did not benefit from vigorous briefing by well-matched combatants. The in re Napster
decision, by contrast, is a landmark for reasoned analysis on this point.
An important case from the Second Circuit that none of the parties cited also provides
guidance on this issue. In Agee v. ParamountCommunications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995),
the court of appeals considered, among other things, a claim for violation of the distribution right
under section 106(3) arising from the satellite transmission of a television commercial
incorporating plaintiffs music in the commercial's soundtrack. The Second Circuit ruled that a
transmission of the work was a public performance and not a distribution. The court of appeals
stated: "distribution is generally thought to require transmission of a 'material object' in which
the sound recording is fixed: a work that is of 'more than transitory duration.' See 17 U.S.C.
§101 (defining "copy"); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 2 rimmer on Copyright, § 8.11[A] (1993)
(distribution right is right 'publicly to sell, give away, rent or lend any material embodiment of
copyrighted work')." Agee, 59 F.3d at 325. While the Second Circuit was "unwilling to say that
disseminations must always be in physical form to constitute 'distributions,"' see id., the
transmission was a "making available" to the public of the copyrighted song. That did not
suffice, however, to make it a distribution under section 106(3).8
III.

EXPANSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT POSES A THREAT OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES TO COMMERCE.
Plaintiffs' proposed expansion of the distribution right would sweep into the reach of

copyright law many activities not now covered by copyright law. Under such an elastic
interpretation and ill-defined standard, the Internet connections and equipment that members of
'Nor was there any indication that the Second Circuit relaxed a requirement of actual
dissemination of a copy or phonorecord for a violation of the distribution right under section
106(3). To the contrary, when the court of appeals cited section 106(3), it referred to actual
transmission of a material object, not a mere offer to transmit. See Agee, 59 F.3d at 325.
10
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Amici furnish may render them vulnerable to accusations that they "make available" a variety of
content, including copyrighted materials, to users. Such activities, e.g., providing Internet
connections, however, do not constitute distributions within the scope of section 106(3). If a
vague conception of "making available" were substituted for the clear statutory provision of
section 106(3), the boundaries of the right would become indeterminate and unpredictable,
creating chilling effects on members of Amici and virtually every other participant on the
Internet. For example, companies routinely include in their web pages hyperlinks that enable
persons to navigate easily to other sites throughout the web by use of browser software. Indeed,
the web is a collection of hyperlinks. Even though the use of hyperlinks makes content located
elsewhere available to a web user, it does not constitute a distributionof that content under
section 106(3). 9
In addition to expanding the scope of copyright, Plaintiffs' "making available" argument
would also sweep many activities pertaining to other rights of a copyright owner into the concept
of "distribution." This would upset the expectations of, and jeopardize, those who have
bargained for licenses of those other rights.
The Copyright Act affords copyright holders not one unitary right but several distinct and
severable rights. For example, one person can own the reproduction right in a work under

) While in a few cases courts have found the use of hyperlinks to violate copyright law, those
cases generally involve instances where defendants have intentionally used hyperlinks to induce
or cause copyright infringement (typically a violation of the reproduction right under section
106(1)), which is actionable as classic contributory infringement. See IntellectualReserve, Inc.
v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). (The traditional
formulation of contributory infringement is that "[olne who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory infringer."' Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. ColumbiaArtists
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).) There is no suggestion that the mere
use of a hyperlink, without knowledge and intent that it would lead to copyright infringement,
constitutes a "distribution" of the linked content under section 106(3).
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section 106(1) while another person can own the public performance right in the same work
under section 106(4). See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (individual rights under section 106 may be
transferred separately). Companies and individuals often enter into contracts that pertain to only
one of the several rights in a particular work. For example, an owner of all rights can license the
reproduction right under section 106(1) but not the derivative works (adaptation) right under
section 106(2). See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.01[A] at 8-17
(2005).
If all instances of "making available" were considered part of the "distribution" right in
section 106(3), then licensees of the public performance rights under sections 106(4) or 106(6) or
the public display right under section 106(5) would fall into a trap. Notwithstanding those
licenses, under Plaintiffs' argument the licensees would be unprotected because they would also
be engaging in an unlicensed distribution as a consequence of their making the work available.
The Copyright Act should not be construed so expansively as to create a trap for licensees in
such circumstances. Many contracts have taken into account clear expectations regarding fights
and obligations based on unambiguous statutory language regarding the various rights of a
copyright holder.
IV.

THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT NEED NOT BE EXPANDED TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OR REMEDIES FOR COPYRIGHT OWNERS
BECAUSE THEY HAVE ADEQUATE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER
OTHER PROVISIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW.
Concern for copyright owners does not require an expansion of the distribution right.

Existing law gives copyright holders a well-stocked arsenal against Intemet-based infringers. To
the extent downloadersviolate copyright law,' 0 it is through violation of the reproduction right
'0 Amici take no position on whether downloads in this case are protected by the fair use
limitation on a copyright holder's rights pursuant to section 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. Evaluation of claimed fair use is extraordinarily fact-specific, requiring case-by-case
12
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under section 106(1). To the extent uploadersviolate copyright law, the violation occurs when
the "upload" results in a corresponding "download" at the other end of the transmission, again a
violation of the reproduction right under section 106(1), for which the uploader may bear
contributory infringement liability.
Plaintiffs wish to establish two violations of copyright law when a person both
downloads and uploads sound recordings via the Internet. Proof of the download violation may
be relatively straightforward when a plaintiff can establish that a recording has been copied to a
person's computer. Proof of a violation by uploading cannot, however, be established merely by
showing the availability of files for potential uploading. A plaintiff must establish a connection
to someone else's actual download. That requires a plaintiff to establish a connection between
an uploader and a corresponding downloader, to establish the facts of an actual transaction
between the two. Although such proof may require investigation, a plaintiff should not be
relieved of its burden. Since copyright holders may (and often do) seek statutory damages of up
to $150,000 per work infringed, see 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(2), without having to prove actual harm,
for such remedies they should be required to furnish allegations and proof of actual violations.
The remedies provide an adequate incentive for a proper investigation.
Amici believe that Plaintiffs want to invoke the concept of "making available" instead of
the statutory elements of a section 106(3) distribution because Plaintiffs perceive that the
investigations needed for proper allegations and proof of uploading liability (as contributory
infringement liability for another's download) are burdensome. Of course, the present motion in
this case relates to a pleading, not a proof, but the two are related. To allege a violation of

analysis. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994); Harper & Row v.
The Nation Enterprises,471 U. S. 539, 560 (1985).
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section 106(3) a plaintiff must allege an actual distribution of copies or phonorecords to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
V.

THE WIPO DIGITAL TREATIES DO NOT CALL FOR AN EXPANSION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION RIGHT.
Plaintiffs argue that the World Intellectual Property Organization's Copyright Treaty and

Performances and Phonograms Treaty support their interpretation of the "distribution" right
under section 106(3). In fact, the text of the WIPO Copyright Treaty by Plaintiffs undermines
their argument. The relevant text is as follows:
Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the
making available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or
other transfer of ownership. (Article 6)
[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. (Article
8)
Plaintiffs have highlighted selected text of those articles in bold face but failed to highlight, or
outright omitted, other critical text. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 20-21.
Plaintiffs failed to note that Article 6 concerns making available "of the original and copies of
their works through sale or other transfer of ownership." Thus that provision covers certain
narrow types of "making available" activity, specifically the same types of activity already
covered by the specific language of section 106(3). See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss of Plaintiffs' broad conception of "making available" as including a mere offer or
potentiality of a transmission, without a "sale or other transfer of ownership," does not even
accord with the treaties they invoke. As to Article 8, the "making available" referred to there, as
an instance of the right of"communication to the public," is covered by the present public
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display and public performance rights in sections 106(4)-(6) of the Copyright Act and does not
justify a distortion of the distribution right in section 106(3).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' disregard for the plain language of section 106(3) should not be countenanced
by this Court in its evaluation of Plaintiffs' pleadings and its consideration of the scope of the
distribution right under section 106(3) of the Copyright Act. This Court should not be persuaded
to embark upon an erroneous substitution of plaintiffs' vague conception of "making available"
for the statutory definition. At the pleading stage now, and at a proof stage later, the Court
should ensure that any "distribution" claims be evaluated under the clear statutory language,
which requires an actual "distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."
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